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Variations in brain size and proportions can be linked
to the cognitive capacities of different animal
species, and correlations with ecology may give
clues to the evolutionary origins of these specializa-
tions. Much recent evidence has implicated the
social domain as amajor challenge driving increases
in problem-solving abilities of mammals. How-
ever, the methods of measurement available to
researchers are often indirect and sometimes
appear to give conflicting answers, and other intel-
lectual challenges may also have been influential in
cognitive evolution. While the cause of an evolution-
ary increase in intelligence may be domain-specific
(sociality, for example), and the brain specialization
that results may largely implicate a single perceptual
system, such as vision, the intelligence shown in
consequence can be very ‘general-purpose’ (as in
primates and some avian taxa). Future research
needs to get beyond vague ascription of ‘greater
intelligence’ or ‘faster learning’ towards a precise
account of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie
particular mental skills in different species; that will
allow theory-testing against data from complex,
natural situations as well as from the laboratory, on
a common metric.
Introduction
Animals vary dramatically in brain size, both in abso-
lute terms and as a fraction of overall body size. Why
should this be? Brain tissue is metabolically expensive
[1], so evolutionary investment in brainpower comes at
a price, and we therefore expect large-brained species
to be ones whose survival depends on dealing with
serious cognitive challenges [2]. The particular nature
of those challenges may give clues to the evolutionary
origin of intelligence in that lineage. Special attention
has historically been given to the origin of primate
intelligence, with the aim of throwing light on the
evolution of human cognition. In order to test among
competing theories, the method generally used has
been to correlate brain size with various estimates of
cognitive challenge, across a range of species. This
approach has led to the accumulation of considerable
evidence for a slightly surprising idea: that social living,
even more than the obvious environmental challenges
of finding enough to eat and avoiding being eaten, has
been responsible for specialization in intelligence [3–
7]. In non-human primates, insectivores, carnivores,
ungulates, insectivorous bats and cetaceans, a com-
mon pattern has been found in the relationship be-
tween brain size and typical group size of the spe-
cies: the larger the group, the larger the brain [8–11].
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such as range area, day journey length, diet type and
how food is obtained have usually turned out to be
unrelated to brain size. It seems that dealing with
social problems may, for a wide range of mammals,
be the biggest intellectual problem to be faced: and
perhaps the extraordinary human brain has humble
origins in the social problems of our remote primate
ancestors [12].
There are, of course, quite a lot of assumptions in
this simple account. The variables — intelligence, cog-
nitive challenges of social life and ecology — cannot
be measured directly, so measurable things (such as
brain size, group size, range area, and so on) have
had to be used as proxy variables: do these really rep-
resent what they are supposed to represent? Sociality
is treated as varying along the simple scale of total
group size, but there are many reasons why an animal
might be social: do these all have equivalent effects?
Certainly it makes sense that a larger brain reflects
a greater need, but what is ‘large’: large in absolute
number of neurons or large in comparison to the
animal’s overall body dimensions [2]? The brain has
an immense range of functions, and function does
not necessarily map neatly onto neural structure: can
the particular areas, whose enlargement appears to re-
sult from selective pressures to solve social problems,
be distinguished from overall scaled increases [13]?
Usually, the tightest correlations have been found
between social group size and the neocortex, an
area that is conspicuously enlarged in several groups
of large-brained mammals, including primates, carni-
vores and cetaceans. Does it thus make sense to treat
the neocortex as the ‘thinking part’ of the mammalian
brain? Not all of these issues can be decided on pres-
ent evidence, but we return to several of them later in
this review. We begin, however, by explaining the
‘social intelligence’ theory in more detail, in order to
examine the extent of its success in understanding
the evolution of advanced cognition. Then, because
other cognitive challenges may also have caused in-
creases in brain capacity, we ask: is social intelligence
separable from general intelligence, and what cogni-
tive mechanisms constitute the rather vague idea of
‘intelligence’ in non-human animals?
Machiavellian Intelligence
Group living has many possible advantages for
animals, most obviously in minimizing predation (by
increased vigilance or dilution of risk) or allowing
cooperation (in locating food or hunting prey). But
living in close proximity to conspecifics also has clear
disadvantages, in terms of direct resource competi-
tion. The tension between aggregation and dispersal
is vividly illustrated in the daily fission–fusion behav-
iour of baboons (Papio papio) living in arid Sahel hab-
itats that they share with a range of predators [14]. At
night, aggregations of hundreds of baboons sleep to-
gether, but when foraging, these groups split up into
tiny parties of three to eight individuals, efficiently
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places by homing in on loud calls from other sub-
groups [15]. This separation and re-joining of groups
allows each individual to benefit from the dilution
effects of ‘being one in a crowd’ when most vulnerable
to predation [16], while reducing competition at food
patches.
Permanent group living is thus a demanding evolu-
tionary option, as resource competition tends to
disrupt group stability: in mammals, however, there
are several taxa — such as primates, cetaceans and
carnivores — in which long-lasting social groups are
regular and conspicuous. The key is that an individual
that can use its intelligence to acquire resources by
stealth or cooperative tactics may be able to retain
the benefits of group living on a more permanent basis.
Niccolo Machiavelli famously recommended politi-
cians to use social manipulation for individual profit,
hence the term ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ for the
idea that social manipulation has been favoured in an-
imal evolution [17]. (Note that, as Machiavelli himself
pointed out [18], the most effective manipulator is
often the most trustworthy, cooperative and respected
member of society: the synonym ‘social intelligence’
emphasises these pro-social traits, but ultimately the
genetical benefit is a selfish one.) Critically, it is argued,
other individuals present a ‘moving target’ of continu-
ally changing behaviour, able to respond to the self’s
strategies with their own [5]: social complexity pres-
ents an inherently greater intellectual challenge than
environmental complexity.
The logic of this theory will only apply if a social
group is a semi-permanent aggregation: not all social-
ity is cognitively demanding. Temporary groupings,
such as flocks of non-breeding ducks on lakes, migrat-
ing herds of ungulates, or fish schools attacking krill
are not predicted to have any such selective effect
on intelligence. Similarly, multi-species groups, such
as the huge assemblies regularly found in tropical
bird species, can provide predator protection by
vigilance and dilution, whilst minimizing the costs of
competition since different species will tend to occupy
somewhat different feeding niches [19]. Aggregations
which are both temporary and multi-species have
even been noted: for instance, baboons and impala
associate together, and here the different perceptual
strengths of a primate and an ungulate may give
additional advantage in avoiding stealth predation.
As with Neotropical bird flocks, diet difference helps
minimize competition, reducing the cost of association
compared to the case of long-lasting groups of
conspecifics.
Enticingly, most reports of apparently ‘smart’
behaviour in mammals come from the relatively few
species that are semi-permanently social, consistent
with the social intelligence proposal. Unfortunately,
comparative psychology has found no acceptable
‘intelligence’ test for animals’ [20], so researchers
have turned to measures of brain size to further exam-
ine the effects of sociality. Positive correlations have
been found between mean social group size and neo-
cortex volume (whether measured in absolute terms,
or in proportion to the size of the rest of the brain) in
all mammalian groups that have so far been examinedsystematically [8–11]. Moreover, in catarrhine primates
(Old World monkeys and apes), group size also corre-
lates with the amount of time individuals spend in so-
cial grooming [8,21], suggesting that these primates
need to spend more time building up networks of po-
tential allies if they live in larger groups. And just occa-
sionally, there has been an opportunity for direct as-
sessment of animals’ use of social manipulation, for
instance in the case of primate tactical deception,
where data were amassed from many studies over
a wide range of species [22] (Figure 1). Of course, ob-
server-effort tends not to be uniform across species,
and frequencies of deception needed to be corrected
for effort. Then, deception was found to be well pre-
dicted by neocortex volume but not affected by rest-
of-brain volume [23].
These three facts have led to widespread accep-
tance of the theory that a major evolutionary stimulus
to brain enlargement in social mammals has been the
need for a larger neocortical area to facilitate more
effective social manipulation, including the need to
keep track of a complex network of social relation-
ships [24–26].
Measuring Brainpower
The high costs of investment in brain tissue mean that,
when a brain is large in relation to lean body mass, it is
a sign of strong selection for problem solving of some
kind [27]. Over longer evolutionary time-scales, how-
ever, this effect may disappear: relatively large brains
are a serious liability, inevitably resulting in evolution-
ary pressure for increased body size. Whether such
change will indeed happen depends on other environ-
mental circumstances, of course; the metabolic
demands of flight, for instance, will make increasing
body size disproportionately costly for birds and
bats, and more generally metabolic rate will constrain
brain size [28].
Brain size relative to body size is not a good mea-
sure of cognitive power, because like any computa-
tional system the brain’s power is ultimately depen-
dent on absolute number of components. Artificial
computing systems are also limited by computing
speed, but this may be less important in vertebrate
brains. True, nerve conduction speed varies with the
diameter of myelinated fibres, and fibres are relatively
thin in the toothed whales and elephants, whose
brains contain as many cortical neurons as those of
humans despite the higher cell packing density of
human neurons [29]. Thus these very large mammals
may have been somewhat liberated from any evolu-
tionary pressure for neural efficiency; but in general
it is perhaps safest to assume brain parameters are
computationally optimal for a given brain’s size and
organization.
Thus, some measure of absolute size is more likely
to index animal intelligence [27,30]. In comparative
studies of the mammalian neocortex, several different
measures have produced mutually consistent results:
absolute volumes, with rest-of-brain volume as a con-
trol variable; ratios in linear proportion to rest-of-brain;
residuals of scaling function between neocortex and
rest-of-brain [8,31].
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a choice of mating partner.
(A) A female gorilla solicits a young silver-
back with head-flagging movements to
remain behind with her when the group
moves on. They subsequently mated
surreptitiously, suppressing the normal
loud copulation calls; the older, leading
silverback of the group would not tolerate
such mating if detected. (B) Here, the lead-
ing silverback catches the ‘secret mating’
partners in the act: note that the eyes of
both partners are focussed to the left of
the photographer, on the male who pro-
ceeded to punish the female with violence.Comparing Theories: Estimating Cognitive
Challenge
To find which source of environmental complexity best
predicts variations in species’ brain size, it is neces-
sary to make some rough-and-ready estimates of the
problems animals face. As we have seen, the usual
approach is to treat the mean size of semi-permanent
groups as an indication of the social challenge. The
logic is that, if the problems arise from ‘other people’,
then the severity of problems must increase at least
linearly with the number of others that one lives with.
(In fact, animals may never socialize with every other
group member, restricting their efforts at building up
alliances to a smaller clique. But clique size has been
shown to increase with mean group size, so the
approximation is fair [32].) However, if a particular spe-
cies has a more refined cognitive understanding, then
individuals of that species may have a lot more to
notice and remember about others than members of
a less discerning one: so there is an element of circu-
larity. Monkeys, at least, recognize other group mem-
bers as individuals, by their voices and their appear-
ance [33]; they know who is close kin to whom, and
who outranks whom [34,35]; they recall and repay fa-
vours by their allies [36–38]; they invest grooming
time building up a network of reliable allies, andmake an effort to reconcile with those allies if they
should come into conflict [39,40]; and they notice
whether interactions among third parties follow the
‘usual’ rules of who is dominant or submissive to
whom [41]. For these species, then, memory load for
social information becomes very significant as group
size rises (Figure 2).
For primates, the major alternative theory that has
been tested against Machiavellian intelligence is that
of ecological cognition. Primates generally must build
up an adequate nutrition from dispersed, largely vege-
table foods in complex tropical environments. It has
been argued that remembering where the key
resources are and when they fruit poses a significant
intellectual challenge [42,43]. In addition, some foods
are hidden, embedded in substrate or inedible casing,
and specialization on embedded foods has also been
suggested to require more imagination than eating
foods open to direct perception [44,45]. However,
when proxy variables have been devised to estimate
the extent of the environmental memory problem —
day journey length, home range area, proportion of
embedded foods — they have not been found to corre-
late with species brain size [46,47].
Admittedly, frugivorous primates have systemati-
cally larger home ranges, and larger brains for their
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R717Figure 2. Elephants also have large brains
and complex societies.
Although the small number of species in
the Proboscidea has prevented compara-
tive analyses of the kind that in other taxa
have linked group size to brain enlarge-
ment, elephants do possess very large
brains and remarkably complex societies.body size than folivorous ones [48]. But this effect may
reflect selection for larger bodies in folivorous species,
rather than larger brains in frugivorous ones [27]. Spe-
cializing on coarse, leafy material requires a large or
compound gut, inevitably tending to make the body
large. Species pairs that differ in this way, like the go-
rilla and the more frugivorous chimpanzee, have
closely similar brains but very different body weights.
As noted above, using brain size relative to body size
is a good way of estimating the strength of evolution-
ary selection pressure (and thus the need for a large
brain), but no way to judge the cognitive potential of
the brain. There is little current evidence that memory
for food — the cognitive map hypothesis — has con-
tributed greatly to the evolution of large brains among
mammals.
Another ecological theory has yet to be fully evalu-
ated. This is that a key cognitive challenge was to
ensure successful hunting (by predators) and avoid-
ance of predation (by prey) [49]. As with Machiavellian
intelligence, predator–prey interactions have the prop-
erty of a ‘moving target’: the individuals that present
the problem are continually acting and reacting in
order to thwart the other. And since the result may
involve death the likely selection pressure on mental
mechanisms that give any cognitive ‘edge’ is very
great. There are a number of suggestive facts in favour
of this theory. Jerison showed that the relative brain
size of successive radiations of Holarctic carnivores
and ungulates increased steadily from the Paleocene
to the Pliocene, apparently in tandem but with the
relative brain size of carnivores always slightly ahead
of that of ungulates [2]. In contrast, the Neotropical
herbivores of the same period, in a continent that
lacked significant mammalian predators, showed no
such systematic increase in brain size over time. In
a natural experiment, the cranial fossils of a Majorcan
bovid showed a striking drop in brain size after its
only mammalian predator died out (Figure 3) [50].
And among living species, the most complex systemsof representational communication yet discovered, in
monkeys, function to enable highly specific predator
warnings to be given to other group members [51].
Social living, therefore, gives these monkeys extra
benefits in predation reduction, on top of any ‘selfish
herd’ dilution effects, when the group becomes a coop-
erative machine for outwitting the predator.
Unfortunately, estimating predation pressure is
generally nigh-on impossible in most environments:
predators are, by the nature of their livelihood, hard
to find and count. Moreover, teasing apart cognitive
effects that result from predator–prey interaction
from those that result from within-group social prob-
lem solving will be particularly tricky when the ultimate,
functional reason for group living is often the minimi-
zation of predation, anyway [52]. And apart from
primates, many of the social mammals that show
particularly large brains are also themselves preda-
tors, for example carnivores and toothed whales [53].
(At least one social carnivore, the spotted hyena,
even displays remarkably monkey-like social organi-
zation [54].) At present, it must be admitted that no
broad, comparative analysis points to predation as
a major source of cognitive advance in evolution; but
it would probably be unwise to dismiss the idea.
In principle, the most rigorous test of the Machiavel-
lian intelligence hypothesis would be to compare the
cognitive skills of a social animal with those of a non-
social, matched ‘control’ species — one that is closely
related, ecologically similar, and so forth — and repeat
this exercise for many such matched pairs. This
approach is fraught with problems of finding appropri-
ate control species, however. How closely related
should these species be? How similar should the
niches the species occupy be in order to claim compa-
rable ecological challenges? And arguably the most
difficult to reconcile: what tests or measures can be
used fairly and reliably to compare the cognitive skills
of the different animals? Tests must be ecologically
valid and physically possible for all species under
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R718Figure 3. Brain size decreases in the
absence of predation risk.
The right-hand skull, with brain endocast
to scale, shows Myotragus balearicus,
a Miocene bovid species that inhabited
Majorca at a time when all major predators
had died out. In contrast to the small brain
ofMyotragus, Miocene bovids of the same
body size retained large brains if they
inhabited continental Europe, where car-
nivores remained a threat. The left-hand
skull is that of Rupicapra rupicapra, sister
taxon to Myotragus. (Picture acknowl-
edgement: Dr Meike Ko¨hler.)comparison. But such species-fair tests of animal
intelligence are, as we have noted, currently non-
existent.
In the face of these difficulties, the most productive
approach so far has been very different: the meta-anal-
ysis of written reports of behaviour [55], comparing
well-defined but broad categories of behaviour, such
as tactical deception, tool using and behavioural inno-
vation. These analyses have allowed comparisons of
the behavioural flexibility of many species at once,
illustrating how the use of ‘smart’ behaviour varies pre-
dictably with social group size and neocortex size,
at least in primates. The emphasis on primates is
currently inevitable, but more reports of pertinent be-
haviours from other species should become available
as interest in cognition spreads among zoologists.
Moreover, increasing understanding of brain organiza-
tion in non-mammalian taxa should allow use of the
comparative method to track evolutionary pressures
on the functional subsystems of their brains. This
should ultimately allow a broader understanding of
the origins of vertebrate cognition.
How Widespread Might Social Intelligence Be?
As we have noted, brain tissue is metabolically costly;
also, the need for energy to be supplied to the brain is
remorseless — even a short interruption causes loss of
tissue — and increased head size may cause other ad-
verse effects, such as birth difficulties in viviparous
species. Large brains are perhaps best avoided,
then, and if they are essential for living in semi-perma-
nent groups we might expect vertebrate sociality to be
rare. This indeed seems to be the case: in amphibians,
reptiles and fish, aggregations are usually temporary
or absent. Convincing reports of advanced cognition
are scarce in any of these species, consistent with
the presumption that they can deal with environmental
problems in ways that do not rely on the flexibility for
which cognitive mechanisms are needed. (The cogni-
tive abilities of some coral-reef fishes [56–58] are a con-
spicuous exception to this generalization, and may
prove to be a convergent case of selection for Machi-
avellian intelligence in a socially complex community
of many sympatric species.) Even in birds, most spe-
cies are socially monogamous (even if breeding iscolonial) and single-species flocks are usually
seasonal or ephemeral. To the extent that there is
any variance in semi-permanent group sizes of birds
to examine, it is not a good predictor of brain size [59].
It would therefore be tidy to report that birds, like
other non-mammalian vertebrates, lack signs of spe-
cialization in advanced cognition. This is not the
case, however. Two avian taxa stand out, the parrots
and the corvids, both in manifest intelligence and in
brain size — relative to body size and, for the larger
species, in absolute terms. Extensive experimentation
with an African grey parrot, Alex, has revealed an im-
pressive range of abilities: referential use of spoken
words, understanding of number, use of relative con-
cepts and same/different judgements, and so on [60].
The even larger brained cockatoos and macaws have
yet to be examined for cognitive capacities, but the
tiny spectacled parrotlet has been found to label spe-
cific individuals vocally [61].
Among corvids, remarkable abilities have been
found in a range of species [62]. Clark’s nutcrackers
make several thousand caches of pine seeds each au-
tumn, and retrieve them over the winter and spring. In
the laboratory, they have consistently outperformed
other, non-storing birds in spatial memory tasks [63].
Scrub jays take account of the decay-rates of cached
food of different types when deciding which of their ca-
ches to excavate and consume [64]; they take account
of the viewing opportunities of competitors when de-
ciding where to cache [65]; they re-cache food in
new places, if competitors might have seen their orig-
inal cache sites [66]; and they take account of which
individual competitors have seen them make caches,
when deciding which to consume first or re-cache in
private [67]. Ravens use competitor’s gaze direction
when hiding food, distinguish between knowledgeable
and ignorant competitors, and use several tactics to
deceive them about location of foods [68,69]. Rooks
readily learn to retrieve food from a tube with a grav-
ity-trap in it, whereas monkeys have proved inept at
similar tasks [70]. These impressive abilities are not
obviously related to the birds’ degree of sociality:
rooks are colonial and feed in temporary feeding
flocks, scrub jays may live in extended families, ravens
are monogamous but form flocks as juveniles,
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mous and rather solitary species. Even where birds
show social manipulation, it is directed at outsiders
rather than group members.
While the social problem solving needed to live in
a large group may be an important stimulus to cog-
nitive development, it is clearly not the only one. At
a more general level, the repeated need to deal
competitively with minds — minds of familiar social
companions in a long-lasting social group, minds
of observant and perhaps individually known com-
petitors in a crowded foraging environment, or
minds engaged in the life-and-death struggle of
predation — may always select for greater cognitive
ability. Wrestling with other minds guarantees that
only highly flexible, responsive mechanisms confer
real advantage. Thus, rather than being seen as
competing, mutually exclusive hypotheses for the
evolution of intelligence, the Machiavellian intelli-
gence of social living and the cut-and-thrust of pred-
ator–prey relations may be just two facets of the
same thing.
Is the Result a ‘Domain-Specific’ Intelligence?
If the advantage gained from efficient and skilful social
manipulation does indeed lead to enlargement of all or
part of the brain, is the outcome a brain specialized for
social problem solving, but perhaps inept at other cog-
nitive tasks? This question resonates with an old de-
bate in psychology: is intelligence a single propensity
to deal with all kinds of information efficiently, or are
there different ‘intelligences’ for different skills? That
historic debate cast the question in terms of whether
a single number, the value of ‘g’, describes a person’s
intelligence, or is intelligence modular, so that each
module might be more or less advanced [71]. It must
be admitted that psychology did not settle the matter
for human psychometrics, largely because the discus-
sion often degenerated into advocacy of rival statisti-
cal methods. However, because the differences in abil-
ity between different species may be expected to be
on a larger scale than the subtle interpersonal variance
within humans [72], it may be possible to make more
progress.
Looking at positive evidence of cognitive sophistica-
tion in animals, many of the most striking cases cer-
tainly concern social understanding and social manip-
ulation: several examples have been given already.
The ability of monkeys, in particular, to notice and
communicate about very subtle social nuances has
been set in stark contrast to their seeming ineptitude
in reacting to the physical world [35]. Critical in this de-
bate were a series of experiments simulating the pres-
ence of bizarre natural history events — for example,
a hippopotamus calling from a desert area — or phys-
ical cues to the presence of a dangerous predator —
such as an antelope body draped over a branch, char-
acteristic of leopard kills, or a broad straight groove in
the sand, characteristic of a large python track. Vervet
monkeys showed no interest in any of these set-ups,
even those apparently signalling the presence of their
major predators [73].
But it is famously difficult to make firm deductions
from negative evidence — maybe the monkeys wereable to detect the falseness of the set-ups, or maybe
making dramatic reactions to every sign of a predator
would be counter-productive. More recent work,
showing that monkeys use the referential calls of other
species, and use memory to reason which danger is
actually present when they hear ambiguous alarm
calls, brings into serious question the proposal that
monkeys are poor at natural history [74–76]. Rather,
perhaps it is their closed repertoire, especially their ap-
parent inability to acquire new motor patterns for their
hands — compared with the great apes, whose manual
repertoire seems productive and open [77,78], and
who readily develop skilful tool-use — that restricts
the ways in which they are able to show their under-
standing of the physical world.
The broad, comparative approach that showed neo-
cortex size to be a good predictor of social manipula-
tion might seem to point to the neocortex as a module
of social intelligence. But in fact a large neocortex has
been found to correlate with frequency of other signs
of intelligence in primates: learning from companions,
tool use, and innovation in behavioural repertoire [79].
It looks as if neocortex size, for primates at least, is
best seen in terms of ‘g’ rather than a specifically social
module [80]. Selection for social manipulation may be
what led to the development of large brains, but the
resulting problem-solving abilities have pay-off in
quite other areas. Advanced cognition also appears
domain-general in corvids, rather than restricted to
food-getting and food-storing domains. Partnerships
in rooks and jackdaws share some of the characteris-
tics of primate alliances [59], including reciprocal aid
and postconflict affiliation [81], and like monkeys, pi-
non jays can learn another bird’s rank from third-party
observation alone [82].
The evolutionary origin of these social skills is
unlikely to be the challenge of social living, as we
have noted, because the tell-tale correlation of brain
enlargement and social group size is missing. It must
be admitted that comparative analyses of brain evolu-
tion are still in their infancy. Birds have a very different
brain organization to that of mammals, with whom they
most recently shared an ancestor over 250 million
years ago, and identifying homologous structures in
bird and mammal brains is fraught with difficulty. Re-
searchers attempting direct comparison with mam-
mals thus often find disorder [83]. Where orderliness
has been found, however, it is measures of innovation
frequency and the use of objects as tools, derived from
meta-analysis of an extensive amateur literature, that
show clear relation to brain enlargement in birds
[84,85]. Any convergence between corvids and pri-
mates must therefore be at the level of domain-general
intelligence. In the case of parrots, whose range of
abilities again suggests a domain-general intelligence
but which are only very distantly related to corvids,
lack of knowledge of natural behaviour prevents in-
formed speculation on the evolutionary origin of their
intellectual abilities.
What Cognitive Mechanisms Does Social
Intelligence Need?
‘Greater intelligence’ and ‘advanced cognition’ are
terms used freely in discussions of sociality and brain
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hedges, avoiding commitment to which particular
cognitive mechanisms the animals in question are dis-
playing. Without cooperative subjects under verbal
instruction in a cognitive psychology laboratory, it
may indeed be very hard to say; but in this final section
we make an attempt to sketch what cognitive mecha-
nisms are minimally implied by the data on social intel-
ligence. The enterprise would be aided by a more
sophisticated approach to understanding the mental
processes involved in complex behaviour, replacing
the blanket approach of ‘learning’ by one in which
the particular cognitive systems of different species
are modelled [86], so that individual cognitive compo-
nents can be compared across species: working mem-
ory, selective attention, episodic memory, anticipatory
planning, and so on. At present, we must begin with
a simpler question: how far can variation between spe-
cies be understood in terms of worse/better, and at
what point do we need to invoke a richer understand-
ing of the organization of animal minds.
The fact that many data sets show a continuous
range of differences, in brain size and in frequencies
of cognitively impressive behaviour, points to cogni-
tive enhancements that are ‘more of the same’, rather
than re-organization of cognitive architecture or the
introduction of entirely new systems.
The highly social animal will certainly require a dis-
criminating perceptual system, in order to distinguish
those subtle cues that enable many different individ-
uals to be recognized, and to identify nuances of facial
expression, body posture or vocal timbre that indicate
mood and disposition [31,87]. Social perception
includes the selective attention mechanisms that allow
a sustained focus on key areas for picking up relevant
information, and avoid distraction by irrelevance. We
know from human experience how powerful this sort
of perception can be, even applied to novel stimuli:
for instance, researchers in one long-running study
regularly recognize individually almost all individuals
of a population of 1200 elephants. What we do not
know is how ‘costly’ it is in brain tissue: but ‘visual’
processing takes up large areas of human cortex,
extending far beyond the visual area of the occipital
lobe, so this may have made a major contribution to
brain enlargement [31]. Primates are specialized for
vision, but in other highly social mammal groups differ-
ent perceptual systems may dominate: most dramati-
cally, sonar in toothed whales and bats.
In addition to perceptual specializations, the com-
plexities of social living may require more powerful
means to register and employ knowledge. Large-
brained, Old World monkeys can learn about other’s
rank and kinship from third-party observations alone
[88], and many instances of subtle social manipulation
by deception must have required learning from rare,
if not unique, past events [89,90]. Very rapid learning,
at least in social situations, is therefore another aspect
where brain enlargement may increase efficiency
of a primitive ability of all vertebrates. Moreover,
knowledge about a substantial number of individuals,
their typical interactions, and the history of who can
be relied upon, must be learned from past events in
order to respond appropriately in social interactionswithin a large monkey group (or, presumably, a
higher-order dolphin alliance, or a wild dog pack), or
to ‘network’ within a social milieu made of many alli-
ances. This would not be possible with a long-term
memory system that was circumscribed or inefficient.
As Sir Bob Geldoff famously remarked after the first
Live Aid concert: ‘‘Is that it?’’ Well, for most animals,
we suspect yes. It is tempting to describe the social
manoeuvring of non-human primates — reconciliation,
alliance formation, tactical deception, referential com-
munication — in human-like terms, as if the animals
construed their actions as we do, planned them in ad-
vance and understood their modus operandi. A closer
look at what these social skills involve suggests other-
wise. Enlargement of mammalian neocortex confers
abilities of highly discriminating perception, rapid
learning in social contexts, and efficient long-term
memory. The great bulk of the ‘smart’ social tactics
of non-human primates and other species can be
understood solely in these terms [17,91]. Indeed,
a great deal of everyday human cognition is entirely
based on sophisticated perception, rapid learning
and extensive memory, though we sometimes
retrospectively glamorize our actions in more richly
intentional terms [92].
Everyday human experience in the social realm,
however, indicates that there is further to go. For
instance, we can work out what someone is likely to
do next, not just on the basis of their past history
with us and their current demeanour, but by working
out what they know and believe: ‘social attribution’,
or ‘theory of mind’. Whether any non-humans can do
this remains somewhat controversial, not least
because it is not entirely clear how we do it ourselves!
A number of ‘theory of mind’ tests, devised with pre-
verbal children in mind, have been ‘passed’ by (for
instance) chimpanzees and corvids [67,93]. It can be
argued, however, that much of our everyday social at-
tribution is carried out by sophisticated, unconscious
statistical extraction of overt but subtle information
[94–96]. It may be that we only more rarely carry out
mental deductions about others’ minds, and that doing
so entails much more ‘work’ cognitively and requires
language. Much the same argument may be made in
the physical realm, where the highly efficient use that
some non-human animals make of the physical
world — including tool use, tool making, and dealing
with mechanical and gravitational forces — may at
root be based on an unconscious, statistically derived
understanding of the complex world they live in, rather
than the kind of propositional knowledge that one
learns in school science classes [97].
The $64,000 question is probably: ‘Can animals plan
for the future?’ It is not unthinkable that non-linguistic
animals are locked into present perceptions and past
memories, and that all their achievements are man-
aged without their ever thinking about what happens
next [98,99]. Finding out definitively, rather than ‘failing
to disprove the null hypothesis’ of inability, is a tall
order, especially so when it comes to social cognition.
If crows, dolphins, chimpanzees or meercats contem-
plate tomorrow, and work out social strategies on the
basis of these anticipations, they have no easy way
to tell us. And indeed, if their companions’ demeanour
Special Issue
R721or intervening events made their best-laid plans infea-
sible, the plans would no doubt be aborted: and
observers would conclude that memory and percep-
tion were all that was determining their behaviour.
While the jury is firmly out on whether animals make
social plans, it may be possible to make more progress
in other realms. And, as we have seen, it is most likely
that advanced cognition — even if it resulted from
selection purely in the social realm — has domain-
general effects, so we should look more widely. Travel,
in a familiar but large-scale environment — an area
that cannot be scoped from a single viewpoint — is
intrinsically about the future: animals set off ‘towards’
places that cannot be seen, and will not be reached
until time has passed. If it can be shown that they set
off with intent to reach those places, then we can be
sure they are able to plan in anticipation and conceive
of absent things and future events.
Recent research has shown that some large-
brained, Old World monkeys show just this kind of abil-
ity when choosing where to forage. Mangabeys take
account of recent past weather when deciding when
unripe figs may be worth revisiting. That is, when
they come close to a tree that has previously not
been a good source of food but showed promise, their
decision to go for it or not depends on the weather of
the last several days, not just the weather of the day
in question [100]. Baboons take account of the likely
risk of other troops exploiting their prized resources.
They make sure they head first to distant foods that
invite exploitation by competing groups even when it
means by-passing perfectly good food of other kinds,
food that they return to eat later in the day [101]. In both
cases, the animals must be computing future events
that might take place at out-of-sight locations, and
taking decisions accordingly.
The food-caching of some corvid species provides
another arena in which advance planning would pay,
and scrub jays show caching tactics that serve to
increase the likelihood that the cache will be undiscov-
ered, but only if they themselves have experience of
pilfering other birds’ caches [66]. Moreover, they
cache food in places that anticipate their future needs
and likely local shortage [102]. It is sometimes argued
that ‘real’ anticipatory planning necessarily involves
decision-making about a future in which the individual
is in a different motivational state to its present one
[98]. This seems to muddle cognitive skills with the
occasion of their use, and moreover the conjecture is
more-or-less untestable in natural environments; but
perhaps the ability to imagine, specifically, one’s own
future bodily state might be a uniquely human one? It
is not. Under controlled captive conditions, scrub-
jays preferentially cache food of a type that they will
value highly in the future, even when their current
motivation to eat that food is low [103]. At least some
animals, therefore, may also be using anticipatory
planning in their social strategizing [104]: perhaps
future studies will be able to home in upon such skills,
currently seen as the province only of humanity.
Future Directions
Comparative analysis of brains has advanced from
using gross measures of total brain or major lobevolume: it is now accepted that evolution has acted
independently on coordinated, functional systems
[31]. Comparative cognition needs to make a similar
transition. Categories as broad as ‘learning speed’,
‘perceptual efficiency’, ‘memory capacity’ and ‘antici-
patory planning’ are inherently unsuitable for compar-
ing the details of cognitive ability between different
species of animal: they reduce all differences to
more/less, yes/no judgements, without helping to
explain how the tasks are actually performed. Within
closely related groups of animals, or in species with
limited, primitive abilities, it has been possible to
finesse the details of information processing and
thus use continuous measures of ‘ability’ to evaluate
evolutionary theories. To go further in understanding
those abilities, and especially when attempting to
understand the advanced cognition that has arisen in
widely-divergent groups of animal — primates, dol-
phins, parrots, crows — it becomes necessary to build
theoretical models of the abilities themselves.
Animal learning theory has proceeded indepen-
dently from human psychology for the last four
decades [105], unaffected by the ‘cognitive revolu-
tion’. Learning theorists remain deeply reluctant to
proliferate intervening variables if ‘association’ can
be invoked, yet are little concerned at the explanatory
adequacy of their theories. Notoriously, broad appeals
to association learning are liable to lack adequacy as
working explanations [106]. Precise models of infor-
mation processing can be posed in terms of associa-
tions and tested in carefully controlled conditions.
However, only quite simple situations can be exam-
ined in this way, meaning that ‘animal cognition’ risks
always being seen as concerning the simple, unlike
the rich complexity of human abilities. If we are instead
to begin to understand the evolutionary origins of that
human intelligence, it will be necessary to evaluate
data from the inconveniently messy environments in
which animals evolved — in the same terms as data
from the neat world of the laboratory. Modelling abili-
ties in cognitive terms, rather than as a mass of asso-
ciations, allows testable models of process to be con-
structed relatively easily even in complex situations
[86], making that more likely to happen.
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